Social science in court by Lempert, Richard O.
Law and Human Behavior, Vot. 10, Nos. 1/2., ]986 
Social Science in Court 
On "Eyewitness Experts" and Other Issues* 
Richard  O. Lemper t?  
This article discusses the role of social science in legal proceedings with special attention to the ethical 
situation of the expert psychologist asked to testify about the reliability of an eyewitness identifica- 
tion. It argues that in this area as in others one cannot discuss the ethics of expert psychological 
testimony without attending to the quality of the research and theory on which the testimony is based. 
It also identifies as considerations that bear on the propriety of such testimony the information the 
fact finder is likely to receive in its absence and the factual guilt of the defendant. The paper goes on to 
discuss the relationship between law and social science more generally. It argues that ultimately 
courts do and should have the last word regarding the place of social science in legal proceedings. 
I N T R O D U C T I O N  
The reaction of courts to social science evidence is frequently an uneasy one. 
What social science tells us is too often closely related to what we all know. If 
social science evidence is congruent with what we know the evidence appears to 
serve little purpose, yet if the evidence is incongruent, it tends to be regarded 
with suspicion. This is not simply because the "truths" of the social sciences can 
seldom be demonstrated with the precision or elegance of physical science 
"truths." It is also because too often social science "truths" as they have been 
marketed to the public (usually in semipopular books and magazines rather than 
through the courts) have later turned out to be either false or, if not false, highly 
contingent on circumstances that were not originally clearly specified. In this 
article I would like to pursue the topic of the appropriate role for social scientific 
evidence in the judicial system with special attention to the question of what 
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expert psychologists can and should be allowed to tell courts about the likely 
credibility of eyewitness testimony. I focus on this topic by way of example be- 
cause interest in this topic unites most of those participating in this symposium 
issue of  Law and Human Behavior. 
Perhaps because the general issue that the symposium addresses concerns 
ethical considerations that apply whenever experimental psychologists are asked 
to testify in court, no paper systematically considers what we know about the 
subject matter of expert psychological testimony. In particular no paper has as its 
central focus the question of what psychologists can or cannot tell us about the 
factors that make for accurate or inaccurate eyewitness identifications. Although 
the common expertise and mixture of viewpoints on this topic quite naturally 
infuse many of the papers in this symposium issue and was reflected in much of 
the discussion at the conference for which these papers were first prepared, I 
think that explicit attention to research on memory and perception as it relates to 
the likely validity of eyewitness identification (taking this as an example) is a 
requisite for intelligent discussion. Both establishing areas of consensus and pin- 
pointing sources of disagreement are to my mind necessary preludes to deter- 
mining the ethical duty of psychologists asked to testify on particular matters. 
Indeed, if the goal is to state what ethics requires, I do not know how this can be 
done unless we know the common assumptions that exist and the divergent be- 
liefs we must confront. 
THE I M P O R T A N C E  OF T H E O R Y  
I want to make two observations that pertain to this topic. The first is to note 
that the word " theory"  is often absent in discussions of the appropriateness of 
generalizing from the laboratory to the courtroom setting. Instead such discus- 
sions typically center on what is called external or ecological validity. The key to 
generalization in science, however, is through theory. While I do not want to 
denigrate the importance of external validity in applied psychological research, 
we can also learn from research that appears far removed from the applied set- 
ting. What is crucial is that a body of research, whatever the external validity of 
the constituent studies, fit consistently into a more encompassing theory. If a 
well-grounded theory applies, in principle, to situations that arise at trials, there 
is a basis for expert psychological testimony. Thus, a crucial question that must 
be confronted in deciding whether psychologists may properly testify as experts 
on eyewitness identification is whether the profession has managed to build 
theories from which we can with some confidence generalize to the trial situation. 
I think that what separates the different positions that people take on the 
propriety of psychologists testifying as experts on eyewitness identification turns 
largely on the answers different people give to this question. Some are confident 
that we can bring to bear on the issue of eyewitness credibility a reasonably broad 
body of well-grounded theory. Others believe that the research relating to witness 
credibility (and I include here basic research on memory and perception) is so 
SOCIAL SCIENCE IN COURT I69 
ambiguous and inconsistent that it is premature to even suggest that we are ap- 
proaching theoretical closure. 
I take a middle ground. I think that different judgments are appropriate in 
different areas. I believe that some of the conclusions eyewitness experts com- 
monly reach have, at best, a tenuous theoretical basis. Two examples are testi- 
mony about the unreliability of cross-racial identifications ~ and the phenomenon 
called weapon focus. I am uncomfortable with receiving testimony in these areas 
because the literature that attempts to explore these matters empirically is sparse 
and has yielded mixed results. To the extent that there are strong theoretical 
bases for what psychologists tell us about such matters, the theories appear 
rooted in common sense rather than systematic psychological experimentation. I 
do not deny that those who testify to the special difficulties that affect, for ex- 
ample, cross-racial identification, can point to some good psychological research; 
but "they all look alike to me,"  which is the message that is conveyed, remains 
essentially a common sense proposition. Not only are there inconsistencies in the 
research that bears on the "look alike" proposition, but if the phenomenon 
exists, we do not yet have an adequately grounded psychological explanation. 
People, psychologists included, approach research with different values and 
strong preconceptions. This can lead them to dismiss research that does not ac- 
cord with their common sense and to acclaim research that does. In principle 
there is nothing wrong with this. Psychologists, if anyone, should be good Baye- 
sians. However, when expert psychological testimony is in large measure just 
common sense that jurors share, and systematic psychological research is con- 
flicting, the jury is not greatly aided by expert testimony and may be misled. 
At the other extreme are psychological theories that are rooted in studies 
which, from the standpoint of the courtroom, have low ecological validity but 
which are so consistently supported or make such good psychological sense that 
juries should be informed of the experts' point of view. The effect of stress on 
perceptual accuracy comes immediately to mind. Although most of the studies 
that tend to show that stress degrades perceptual performance do not expose 
subjects to the kinds of stress witnesses to crimes face, the research seems suffi- 
ciently consistent and sufficiently related to the effects that stress has on other 
kinds of performance, that expert testimony on the way in which stress is likely 
to affect a witness's perceptual accuracy and later recall is, in my opinion, justi- 
fied. The test imony may be particularly valuable because some people's 
common sense suggests that matters perceived under conditions of great stress 
are seared into the brain. 
Now I may be wrong in my particular examples, for unlike most contributors 
I am thinking here of cross-racial identifications generally. Psychologists have a better basis for 
suggesting there are special dangers to identifications of blacks by whites than they do when identi- 
fication involve other cross-racial configurations. This reflects the amount and ecological validity of 
the research that has been done rather than a satisfactory general theory. Indeed, with a satisfactory 
theory an understanding of the relative strengths and weaknesses of particular types of same and 
cross-racial identifications should be possible. 
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to this symposium issue I am not a psychologist and may not be sufficiently fa- 
miliar with the relevant literature. But even if my examples do not persuade, I 
believe my basic point is sound. The issue that is worth discussing is not whether 
psychologists should or should not be allowed to testify as experts on the foibles 
of eyewitness identification. Rather, it is how well-rooted in psychological theory 
are the generalizations that expert psychologists are called on to make in front of 
the jury. 
R E D U N D A N C Y  A N D  A C C U R A C Y  
A second matter that is not discussed in the other papers which I would like 
to address is the question of when eyewitness testimony identifying a defendant 
as the criminal is likely to be accurate. In a probabilistic sense at least, I believe 
the answer is simple. The identification testimony of eyewitnesses is, by and 
large, quite good, in the sense of being accurate, when there is a substantial body 
of other evidence that points to the defendant's guilt. Eyewitness identifications 
are probably not very good, in the sense that there is a substantial possibility that 
they are inaccurate, when there is little evidence apart from the eyewitness testi- 
mony that suggests the defendant is guilty. Assuming I am right, there is the 
interesting implication that the likely accuracy of an eyewitness may be better 
judged by the way his or her evidence accords with other evidence in the case 
than by the psychodynamic features of the observational or testimonal setting. 
What follows from this? If our goal is to maximize the probability of correct 
jury verdicts, the argument suggests that experts testifying to the foibles of eye- 
witness identification should be most welcome when the evidence against the 
defendant, apart from the eyewitness testimony, is weak. Indeed, in increasing 
the skepticism with which jurors approach the eyewitness testimony, the expert 
may serve to counterbalance a known failure of human reasoning, namely, the 
common tendency to insufficiently attend to the probative value of "absent" in- 
formation--in my example the fact that there is little evidence apart from the 
eyewitness identification suggesting that the defendant is guilty. Conversely, 
where there is considerable circumstantial evidence suggesting the defendant's 
guilt, another failure of human rationality becomes salient. People do not cumu- 
late evidence in a Bayesian-rational way, in that they often fail to appreciate how 
extremely probative a consistent body of evidence can be. When the inculpatory 
circumstantial evidence is substantial, there is good reason to bar testimony that 
casts doubt on the likely accuracy of eyewitnesses. Not only is eyewitness testi- 
mony consistent with highly probative circumstantial evidence likely to be accu- 
rate, whatever its apparent flaws, but any tendency to overvalue the eyewitness 
testimony may correct, in a loose way at least, for natural tendencies to under- 
value the cumulative impact of inculpatory circumstantial evidence. The net re- 
sult is likely to be that justice, over the run of cases, is enhanced if experts on 
eyewitness identification are allowed to testify when the evidence against the 
defendant is, apart from the eyewitness testimony, weak, and barred from testi- 
fying when the other evidence in the case is strong. 
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Now if this intuition is correct, it may be that our legal system, which makes 
the admission of "eyewitness expert" testimony discretionary, is welt suited to 
enhancing justice. I venture the hypothesis--not having done the systematic re- 
search needed to support it--that judges apply a rule of thumb when the testi- 
mony of psychological experts on eyewitness identification is proffered. If they 
think the prosecution's case is weak, they tend to allow the expert testimony, and 
if they think the prosecution's case is strong, they tend to exclude it. The goal in 
each case is the same: to do justice. I do not want to be a Pollyanna, but I think 
we have in practice a better system than an analysis of the formal legal rules that 
govern the admissibility of expert testimony in this area might suggest. Indeed, 
one court seems to have adopted the position I espouse here. 2 The case, People 
v. McDonald involved a California man who had been found guilty of murder in 
the course of a street robbery and sentenced to death solely on the basis of the 
testimony of seven eyewitnesses. The eyewitnesses varied in the certainty of 
their identification, many had had a partially obstructed view of the incident, 
several had not picked the defendant out when first presented with a six- to ten- 
person photo array, and an eighth eyewitness was confident that the defendant 
was not the man at the scene. The defendant in the case presented six alibi wit- 
nesses whose testimony, if believed, meant that the defendant could not possibly 
have committed the crime. 
Justice Stanley Mosk, writing for a unanimous California Supreme Court 
held: 
When an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of the prosecution's 
case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving it independent reliability, 
and the defendant offers qualified expert testimony on specific psychological factors 
shown by the record that could have affected the accuracy of the identification but are 
not likely to be fully known to or understood by the jury, it will ordinarily be error to 
exclude that testimony (208 Cal. Rptr. 236,254; emphasis added). 
I want to make two further points before I leave this issue. First, discussions 
about the admissibility of expert testimony in the eyewitness area typically pro- 
ceed on the assumption that if experts did not testify about eyewitness testimony 
nothing would be said about the quality of the eyewitness's report. This assump- 
tion is of tennindeed my guess is almost always--mistaken. Attorneys argue 
issues of eyewitness credibility whether or not experts testify on the topic. How- 
ever tenuous the psychological foundations of expert testimony, expert opinion 
as a whole is likely to provide a better basis for judging eyewitness credibility 
than the folk wisdom that zealous advocates share. For example, in an evidence 
book I coauthored (Lempert and Saltzburg, 1982) there is a transcript of a case 
tried in 1967 in which the prosecution sought and secured the death sentence for 
rape. The crucial evidence in the case was the eyewitness testimony of the 
victim, a 65-year-old white woman assaulted by a black man. For all but a few 
2 My reflections are independent on the court's views and vice versa, since my observations preceded 
the decisions in McDonald by about a year but were not available to the judges who decided that 
cas~, 
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seconds this woman saw her assailant only in a room that was dimly illuminated 
by lights in other rooms. In arguing for the adequacy of the eyewitness identifica- 
tion, the prosecutor told the jury, "There is not a man on this jury, if you had to 
come in close contact with him under heat of passion or excitement but what you 
would remember his face as long as you live" (1176). Perhaps some psychologists 
would dispute the idea that stress interferes with perceptions and later recall, but 
I would be surprised if any would agree with this prosecutor's armchair psy- 
chology. Too often the debate over the desirability of allowing psychologists to 
testify as experts on eyewitness identification proceeds as if the choice were be- 
tween the jury's  uneducated common sense and generalizations that some think 
are not adequately supported by psychological research. In fact, the choice may 
be between expert testimony that may in some respects by controversial and the 
self-interested folk wisdom of attorneys that clearly misstates what we do know. 
My second point may be illustrated with the aid of an extreme example. 
Consider a situation where an elderly white woman caught a momentary glance of 
a black robber who shot at her as he was fleeing a bank he had just robbed at 
dusk. The witness after telling the police that the robber was of average height 
picked the defendant, who it turns out was a busboy at a restaurant she frequents, 
from a lineup in which everyone but the defendant, who is 5'9", was 6'2" tall or 
taller. The witness is willing to testify that she is absolutely certain the defendant 
robbed the bank. Here is ample grist for any expert psychologist's mill. Most 
psychologists would agree that the witness's certainty has no bearing on her ac- 
curacy, and many would argue that her lineup identification is worthless or close 
to it. But assume that all the money taken from the bank was found under the 
defendant's bed in his one room apartment, that ballistic tests show that a gun 
taken from the defendant is the gun the robber used, and that the defendant has 
confessed to the crime. The only problem with the state's case is that the defen- 
dant's confession has been suppressed as involuntary, and the evidence per- 
taining to the gun and money has been excluded as the fruit of an illegal search 
and seizure. Thus, the government's case rests heavily on the eyewitness testi- 
mony. 
I believe that a psychologist who voluntarily testified for the defendant in 
this case would be acting unethically. More generally, I think it is or should be a 
breach of ethics for a psychologist to volunteer testimony that calls the reliability 
of an eyewitness identification into question when the psychologist knows--from 
whatever source--that the identification is in fact correct. 3 1 say this even though 
the eyewitness' testimony is, as in my example, fraught with the potential for 
error, and the psychologist's testimony is carefully limited and honest. The psy- 
chologist's role as expert is to help the trier of fact reach an accurate conclusion 
about whether the eyewitness's testimony can be trusted in the instant case. 
When the psychologist knows that his or her testimony, which is true in a statis- 
3 A difficult question, which I am not addressing, arises if the witness on some moral ground is 
opposed to the trial or punishment of the defendant for the crime in question. The ethical question is 
also more complex and hence not considered here if the eyewitness is not testifying honestly or if his 
recall has been intentionally manipulated by the police. 
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tical sense, will, if accepted, lead to an inaccurate judgment in the case at hand, 
the psychologist has an obligation not to give it. There is no reason for the psy- 
chologist to be a knowing instrument of injustice. 
In this the expert psychologist differs from the lawyer. We would almost 
certainly convict more guilty people if lawyers refused their cases. However, 
there is a constitutional right to counsel along with a concomitant obligation on 
lawyers t 9 defend the guilty as well as the innocent and to take actions, such as 
motions to suppress evidence, that will lead to the acquittal of factually guilty 
clients. The expert has no such obligation to aid the guilty. Nor does a system in 
which the state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt require that experts 
participate when their testimony can only mislead the fact finder. This too distin- 
guishes experts from lawyers, whose presence has come to be seen as essential to 
the viability of such a system. 4 
My example is, of course, far clearer with respect to the defendant's factual 
guilt than most cases expert psychologists will confront. Ordinarily I think the 
ethical expert must respect his or her own subjective judgment. If the expert 
believes the defendant is innocent or that his guilt, as a factual matter, is genu- 
inely in doubt, I see no special problem with the decision to testify. If the expert 
believes the defendant is in fact guilty, even if the evidence of guilt might not be 
sufficient to persuade a jury or another expert, I believe that the expert has de- 
fined for him or herself the course of injustice, and that the ethical expert will 
avoid it. 
SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTS 
Now let me change the focus of my remarks and address some broader 
issues about the place that testimony by social scientists has in our trial system. 
My basic theme is captured by the familiar joke about the five-hundred pound 
gorilla. The question is, "What does a five-hundred pound gorilla do when he 
meets you in a dark alley at midnight?" The answer is ~ he wants to 
do."  When social science encounters the trial system, the law is the gorilla. The 
law sets the parameters for what the social scientist can do. This, of course, does 
not mean that social science can not influence what the law allows. If you want to 
attract a gorilla, you can hold up a banana. The problem is that if the gorilla is 
attracted it may take the entire bunch of bananas including some that are not ripe 
or those you were saving for yourself, and it may take your hand off in the pro- 
4 Criminal defendants do have a right under the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment 
to secure the testimony of witnesses in their favor. At most this imposes on a witness an obligation to 
testify truthfully when subpoenaed. It does not speak to the situation of the witness who voluntarily 
testifies. Moreover, the clause does not give a witness a right to secure any testimony in his favor. 
Perjury, however helpful, remains forbidden. Whether there is a right to honest testimony which a 
witness would rather not give because he or she knows it will be misleading in context is a question 
that no court to my knowledge has addressed. Moreover, it is unclear what the compulsory process 
clause implies when an expert is unwilling to testify at the defendant's behest. 
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cess. One moral is that when social scientists seek to inform the law, they should 
proceed carefully. 
THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
The law may attend to what social scientists tell it, but it will view the social 
scientist's contribution from a legal perspective which may be quite different 
from the scientific perspective and carry some unanticipated implications. Con- 
sider, for example, the article by McCloskey and Egeth (1983), which in disputing 
the potential contribution of expert testimony on eyewitness identification pro- 
vided some of the impetus for the conference that led to this special issue of Law 
and Human Behavior. I regard this article as an important and helpful one in the 
sense that it stimulates a potentially valuable reexamination of the body of "eye- 
witness research" and properly questions whether the theories that eyewitness 
experts advance are in fact grounded in careful psychological studies. In addition, 
the debate it has generated among psychologists will help set the agenda for the 
next few rounds of experimentation. While I do not agree with a number of 
McCloskey and Egeth's conclusions, I think psychology will benefit substantially 
from further thinking about what many had treated as closed issues. 
From a psychological or social science standpoint all this is fine. It is through 
disputes like that which McCloskey and Egeth generate that science advances 
and we get closer to social science truths. But consider what might happen when 
an article like this gets into the legal system, as it might if a prosecutor calls a 
court's attention to it in an effort to exclude the testimony of a defendant's psy- 
chological expert. If the jurisdiction applies the Frye test, as many do, the crucial 
question will not be whether McCloskey and Egeth are closer to the truth than 
psychologists who take opposing positions. Nor will it be whether the contribu- 
tion that psychology can make is somewhere in between the positions espoused 
by the protagonists in this debate. Under the Frye test the crucial question is 
whether the theory on which the testimony is based is generally accepted in the 
relevant scientific community, which in this case is psychology. Thus, in law, 
unlike psychology, there is a danger that McCloskey and Egeth will win hands 
down, by default as it were. Just by creating a controversy in an important 
journal they provide prosecutors with ammunition that some courts might con- 
sider sufficient to show that the theories that underlie the testimony of eyewitness 
experts are not generally accepted within the psychological community. 5 
5 Their article was not sufficient to persuade the California Supreme Court in People v. McDonald. 
The McDonald court argued that Frye applies only to novel devices or processes like lie detectors 
and hypnosis. They argued that Frye does not apply to the testimony of psychological experts on 
eyewitness testimony because no novel scientific methods are involved. I regard this effort to distin- 
guish Frye as the weakest part of the decision. I expect that if the judges thought that the psycholog- 
ical community did not regard the testimony that experts on eyewitness identification give as gener- 
ally valid, they would not have reversed the decision below. Despite McDonald, a court might 
reasonably cite the work of critics like McCloskey and Egeth as evidence that the Frye test was not 
fulfilled. 
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What the law should be concerned with is the merits of the positions taken 
by the disputants and not the mere existence of a dispute. We know that the 
opinions of psychologists on what "eyewitness experts" have to offer differ sub- 
stantially. Some would ban their testimony while others seem to feel that there is 
hardly an issue on which psychologists cannot enlighten jurors. The most defen- 
sible position as I have argued above is likely to be somewhere in the middle. On 
some issues but not on others psychologists can provide jurors with reliable in- 
formation they would not otherwise appreciate. 
Yet if the Frye test controls, the courts may never come to ask whether there 
are any reliable middle positions. It is not, however, clear that the Frye test will 
dominate. The Federal Rules of Evidence and its state counterparts appear to 
apply a more general test of relevance--namely, will the jury be helped--to the 
admissibility of expert opinion. But it is certainly premature to proclaim the death 
of Frye, for it is cited and followed by many courts, even in federal rules jurisdic- 
tions. Furthermore, there is a justification for Frye. If psychologists cannot arrive 
at a consensus on the value of such testimony, how can a psychologically naive 
judge, whose primary task is to resolve the case in front of him, be expected to 
value it properly? 
If we as social scientists should be concerned with the merits of the contro- 
versy, what the courts should be concerned with is whether the jury will be aided 
-- that  is, be able to better evaluate eyewitness testimony over the long run--if  
psychologists are allowed to testify. The questions are closely related but are not 
the same. Evidence which is sufficiently mixed so that the scientific community is 
properly unwilling to treat an hypothesis as proven may nevertheless provide 
knowledge that is sufficiently more reliable than the average juror's common 
sense that the jury is aided by learning of it. For example, even if a complete lack 
of association between witness accuracy and witness confidence has not been 
shown, it appears clear that any relationship is far weaker than most people 
would expect. 
THE MISSING DIMENSION 
Psychologists could better contribute to decisions that the law must reach if 
they expanded their research horizons to encompass the questions of how jurors 
currently evaluate eyewitness testimony and how their evaluations are affected 
when experts appear. Some researchers are beginning to examine these ques- 
tions, but as is often the case when social scientists mark out a new area for 
exploration, the early research tends to be crude. Studying the effects of eyewit- 
ness and eyewitness expert testimony on the jury requires close attention to eco- 
logical validity. In particular, experimental subjects should represent the jury eli- 
gible population and deliberations should be allowed. Also actual jury trials 
should be observed and the jurors questioned. These aspects of ecological va- 
lidity are so important because the knowledge base of most jurors is likely to 
differ substantially from that of more accessible student subjects and because 
groups use information in ways that are not captured by the sum of what indi- 
vidual members know. 
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THE IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH 
Courts not only define the issues on which social science research is rele- 
vant; they also decide what weight to give it. In doing so, they are clearly in- 
fluenced by the respect accorded the research within the relevant social science 
discipline. But they are not controlled by the discipline's views. Furthermore, 
courts are not above using social science in the same way in which they use some 
case precedent and law review articles: to justify decisions that would have been 
exactly the same had the scholarship or precedent never existed. This latter use 
occurs largely at the appellate rather than the trial level, and I want to address my 
next few remarks to it. 
I am always struck by the way the social science community reacts to judi- 
cial references to social science information, particularly references by the Su- 
preme Court. It is as if social scientists have an urge to prove the practical rele- 
vance of social science in general and of their own work in particular, and as if 
there is no greater proof of that relevance than citation by the Supreme Court. 
This is not only true of those whose work is cited, but it is also true, and perhaps 
even more so, of those who criticize the Court for its apparent reliance on social 
science research. Both act as if the research was important to the decision and for 
this reason socially important. Those who take this view rarely understand how 
courts operate. 
Most social science research is only mentioned in the footnotes to an 
opinion, and a footnote is just that. For example, it is clear that Brown v. Board 
of Education would have come out the same way had the social science brief 
never been filed and the famous footnote 11 never appeared. The groundwork for 
Brown was laid not in Kenneth Clark's laboratory, but in a series of cases which 
declared such things as the white primary and segregated law schools unconstitu- 
tional. To take another example, consider the jury size cases, Williams v. 
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) and Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973). The 
Justices who wrote these opinions have been criticized, both for misreading psy- 
chological research and for relying on obviously flawed studies. These criticisms 
are fair ones, but the posited reliance almost certainly did not exist. It is most 
unlikely that the Justices carefully perused the relevant social science research 
before casting their votes in conference and assigning an opinion. Instead, they 
cast their votes based on their common sense judgments of what different jury 
sizes implied for values they thought the Constitution was intended to preserve. 
The social science entered in when a Justice's law clerk, a recent law graduate 
lacking social science expertise, was assigned to draft or substantiate an opinion 
expressing the Court's will. The clerk, no doubt, searched for social science 
studies that supported the decision since the relevance of social science was ob- 
vious. This process, if I am correct, is not much different from what it would have 
been had the search been for support in legal precedents or treatises. 
Clerks more than occasionally mischaracterize precedents or legal argu- 
ments, and they are selected for their expertise in reading this literature. Thus, it 
is no wonder that some of the social science cited in Williams and Colgrove was 
in part misinterpreted or worthless, and it should be a comfort to know that these 
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mistakes almost certainly did not affect the decision. The clerk, of course, re- 
mains anonymous, but pity the poor Justice when the whole community of social 
scientists rushes to the attack as if the misreading of social science led zo a mis- 
taken decision. 
I do not mean by this analysis to suggest that social scientists should ignore 
courts that miscite or otherwise misuse social science findings. The case for such 
criticism does not turn entirely or even largely on whether or not courts are in- 
fluenced by the social science they cite. Social scientists rather than lawyers are 
the appropriate judges of what courts may appropriately conclude from empirical 
research and scientific theory, and only by paying close attention to what courts 
say, can we, over the long run, improve the way social science is used. All I am 
arguing here is that we keep the judicial use of social science in proper perspec- 
tive. We should not exaggerate the contributions of social science research to 
judicial decisions. 
A proper perspective on the judicial use of social science also requires the 
critic to appreciate the fact that courts, unlike social scientists, must reach a 
conclusion now and should draw on the best available knowledge. A failure to 
appreciate this not only leads to unmerited criticism of judicial opinions, but 
sometimes means that courts are held to standards that are not applied rigorously 
within the scientific community. Let me illustrate this point. 
I expect the reason I was asked to participate in this symposium is ultimately 
traceable to an article I wrote on the jury size issue (Lempert, 1975). This article 
first brought my name to the attention of psychologists. The article discussed the 
Williams case and the issue of whether s!x-member juries were qualitatively dif- 
ferent from twelve-member juries. When I began the article, I vaguely remem- 
bered a literature on group size that I had read as a graduate student which I 
thought directly addressed this issue. I expected to be able to go to this literature, 
find studies of six-member versus twelve-member groups and extrapolate from 
them to the issues that concerned or should have concerned the Williams court. 
So I proceeded to read every article I could find that discussed size effects in 
small groups. I found numbers of studies of two and three person groups, some 
studies of groups with four, five or six members, and a few studies of larger 
groups. There was almost nothing in this sizable literature that compared the 
performance of six-member and twelve-member groups. So what did I do--forget 
the article? Not after the investment I had made! I extrapolated from what was 
there. I developed more general theories. I made predictions. I think it is fair to 
say that not only was the resulting article well received by professional psycholo- 
gists, but virtually all the research comparing six-person to twelve-person juries 
that came afterwards confirmed my generalizations and predictions. In other 
words, my intuition that I could use studies that compared groups of two, three, 
four, and six to develop sound theory about the likely differences between groups 
of six and twelve appears to have been correct. 
Compare the reaction to this article and my generalizations to the reactions 
to Justice Blackmun's use of social science in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 
(1978). (I should note that unlike Williams, social science arguably influenced this 
opinion since references to social science are not confined to the footnotes but 
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are an integral part of the text.) To overgeneralize only slightly, Justice Blackmun 
in Ballew drew on the post-Williams literature on jury size to hold that while 
six-member juries were constitutional, juries of five were impermissibly small. 
He was criticized by social scientists who pointed out that he had relied on 
studies, almost all of which compared juries of six and twelve, to reach conclu- 
sions about the likely differences between juries of six and five. Yet we as social 
scientists had not provided more apposite research (we seem always to study the 
problem the Cour t  d isposed of  wrongly  yes te rday) ,  and sure ly  Jus t ice  
Blackmun's generalization down is as reasonable as my generalization up. In- 
deed, it is probably more so. It is at least plausible that after a certain size (and 
one might before the recent research have argued that it was six) additional group 
members do not substantially affect the dynamics of group decision-making pro- 
cesses. Yet we know that the dynamics in dyads differ dramatically from the 
dynamics in triads and these in turn differ substantially from what occurs in four- 
person groups. While the difference between six- and five-person juries may not 
be as great as the difference between six- and twelve-person juries, surely it is 
reasonable to generalize from the twelve- versus six-person studies to the likeli- 
hood of further important differences as juries get progressively smaller. 
The reaction to Ballew suggests that Justice Blackmun, because he lacks a 
Ph.D., lacks a license to draw reasonable theoretical generalizations, or, to be 
perhaps fairer to the critics, the adverse commentary may bebecause Blackmun, 
in deciding cases, does not specify the justification for his generalizations as care- 
fully as a social scientist would when writing for a social science journal. In any 
case, my message is the same. Critics of the judicial use of social science should 
appreciate the problems faced by decision makers who must reach decisions 
whatever the deficiencies in the current stock of knowledge, and they should 
make allowances for the fact that cultural and contextual factors mean that judi- 
cial writing is unlikely to reveal the kind of  reasoning from research that is cus- 
tomary in social science. Furthermore, it is not necessary that judges be as 
careful with their social science as social scientists are, for specific social science 
findings will be only one of a number of factors that influence a court, and usually 
the precise findings will not be very important, so long as the idea is generally 
sound. 
FACT F I N D I N G  OR APPEAL 
In my comments thus far, I have distinguished between the use of social 
science experts by courts that must resolve factual issues at trials and the use of 
social science research to make law on appeal. The distinction is fundamental and 
in any discussion of social science and the law must always be kept in mind. 
Juries and trial judges hearing cases without juries do not, by and large, decide 
any great policy issues. They decide issues of fact. Appellate courts decide policy 
issues, for they interpret and make law. 
How we as social scientists participate in the legal process, what we can say 
SOCIAL SCIENCE IN COURT 179 
and how we can say it, depend on whether we are concerned with influencing fact 
finding at trial or law making on appeal. If the goal is to influence appellate deci- 
sion making one is, generally speaking, well advised to publish in Psychology 
Today, or better still the Atlantic or the New York Times Magazine, rather than in 
any of the peer-referred journals that count so heavily when tenure is at stake. 
Publications in prestigious professional journals may be cited by courts, but the 
citation is unlikely to have really mattered. Publications in journals that nourish 
the popular intellect are unlikely to be cited (after all, what court wants to ac- 
knowledge relying on the Atlantic for scientific enlightenment?) but may well 
influence the judiciary's general perception of reality and so affect the perspec- 
tive in which judges see the case. Consider Henry Katven's (1968) question, "For  
social science learning to have an impact on the living law, will it first have to 
become popular learning . . . ?"  (68, emphasis in original). The question as I 
understand it, is rhetorical, and the expected answer is, "Yes ."  Thus, if psychol- 
ogists should establish the general unreliability of eyewitness testimony and if 
that general unreliability should become common knowledge, the courts will be 
likely to reach decisions, such as decisions mandating the admissibility of expert 
psychological testimony, that presuppose that unreliability. (Note the irony here: 
If knowledge of the foibles of eyewitness testimony were genuinely common 
rather than confined to an educated elite, expert testimony on the subject should 
not be admissible because it would not substantially aid the jury.) 
SOCIAL S C I E N C E  AS R A T I O N A L E  
The other side of this is that until scientific findings are generally accepted, 
at least among the educated elite, we must be wary of courts that defer to social 
science. The deference may be due less to the implications of scientific research 
than to the court's desire to achieve independently defined ends. By way of illus- 
tration, consider the case of Chapple v. State, 135 Ariz, 281 (1983). In Chappte, 
the Arizona Supreme Court became the first appellate court anywhere (The Cali- 
fornia court in McDonald is the second) to hold that a trial judge abused his 
discretion when he barred an expert on eyewitness identification from testifying. 
Chapple is interesting not so much for its result as for the fact that it is hard to 
imagine a worse case for departing from established precedent. The typical eye- 
witness identification involves either a victim who perceives a criminal for sev- 
eral stressful minutes or a casual observer who gets a relatively brief glimpse of 
the perpetrator of a crime. Psychologists may have something to offer the jury in 
the former case because there are substantial theoretical reasons to believe that 
stress interferes with perception, and they may have something to offer in the 
latter case because it is the paradigm for the most ecologically valid research 
done on this topic. But Chapple involved neither of these situations. Instead it 
involved two participants in a homicide testifying against an alleged copartici- 
pant. While the alleged coparticipant was originally a stranger to the witnesses, 
by the time they parted they had been together for several days in a variety of 
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settings. Some of these settings, like killing together, were, no doubt, stressful; 
others like riding from an airport together or sharing a beer were almost certainly 
not. 
Some features of the identification, like the possibility of suggestive ques- 
tioning and the danger of unconscious transference from a photo spread that did 
not yield an identification, relate to matters on which psychologists often have 
something to offer juries. However,  resistance to suggestion and the incidence of 
unconscious transference almost certainly interact with the time period over 
which the witness views the target and the conditions under which the observa- 
tions occur. In the absence of good psychological research showing only a min- 
imal interaction effect, it is plausible if not likely that even well-established 
threats to the validity of  eyewitness identifications are of little import when an 
acquaintance lasts for several days as it did in Chapple. Certainly an expert psy- 
chologist has little in the way of ecologically valid research or well-grounded 
theory to offer a jury on the facts of this case. 
Yet Chapple established a precedent for the admission of.expert testimony 
that other appellate courts confronted with the exclusion of apparently more in- 
formative expert testimony had refused to endorse. Why did the Arizona Su- 
preme Court choose this unpropitious case to break new ground? I can only spec- 
ulate, but my guess is that the Arizona Supreme Court believed that the eyewit- 
nesses were lying and that Chapple was innocent. 6 Chapple had what seemed to 
be a very good alibi; there is little reason to suppose he would have participated 
in the murder, and the eyewitnesses appeared to have benefitted from a plea 
bargain that gave them an incentive to identify someone. In addition, there is a 
hint in the briefs that there was a more likely suspect who was never energetically 
pursued. From this perspective, the decision is not unusual. In cases where an 
injustice appears to have been done below, appellate courts commonly search for 
some evidentiary error at trial that will justify overturning the conviction. Here 
they focused in part, most unfortunately perhaps, on the exclusion Of the eyewit- 
ness report. 
The decision in Chapple will be unfortunate if psychologists, particularly 
those opposed to the admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification, 
find in Chapple an occasion to chastise a court for its misunderstanding of what 
psychology can offer and seek to draw from critiques of Chapple the lesson that 
such testimony should never be admitted. To do this is, if anything, even less 
defensible than the attempt to generalize from the classic research on eyewitness 
testimony to the situation in Chapple. The issue is an important one, but the 
debate should proceed with more typical cases in mind. If I am correct in my 
speculation about what motivated the Chapple court, the admissibility of expert 
eyewitness identification testimony was never really the issue. 
From the lawyer's standpoint the question whether to allow psychologists to 
testify on eyewitness credibility involves no great policy issue but is simply a 
6 A view of the merits may also have influenced the California Supreme Court in McDonald. Reading 
the opinion in McDonald one senses that the court probably thought that there was a good chance 
that an innocent man had been sentenced to death. 
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matter of evidence law. Yet prosaic or not, the issue is important. Life, liberty 
and the release of dangerous criminals to the street are among the values at stake. 
What should the courts do? Should experts on eyewitness credibility be routinely 
allowed to testify? Should they be always barred? Or is an ad hoc balancing ap- 
proach appropriate? Let me duck these questions with another story. Casey 
Stengel, who managed the Yankees while I was growing up, claimed at one time 
to have dreamed that he died and went to heaven. The first thing that happened 
when God saw him was that God said to Casey, " I 'm so glad your're here. I want 
you to organize a baseball team. Here are your players." Casey looked out and 
he saw Babe Ruth, Ty Cobb, Walter Johnson, Christy Mathewson and others like 
them, the greatest players of all time. So he built a team and worked with his 
players--they had gotten a little out of shape over the years--until they were in 
their peak condition. Just then--just as Casey was wondering who this heavenly 
host could possibly playmthe phone rang. It was Satan, calling to challenge the 
Lord's team to a game. Casey was delighted and accepted immediately, but then 
he added, "You don't  understand, you don't have a chance. I 've got all the 
players." Satan replied, "No,  you don't understand. I 've got all the umpires." 
The umpire exists, whether social scientists like it or not; it is the legal system. It 
will be the law and not psychology that will decide if, and under what conditions, 
experts on eyewitness identification will be allowed to testify. As in baseball, 
little is to be gained from arguing with the umpire. But this umpire, perhaps un- 
like its baseball counterpart, can be educated. It is here that psychology can 
make its greatest contribution. 
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